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 1017 
“YOU JUST NEED TO DO IT!”1: WHEN 
TEXTS ENCOURAGING SUICIDE DO NOT 
WARRANT FREE SPEECH PROTECTION 
Abstract: Is it constitutional to hold an individual criminally liable for another’s 
suicide when words alone drive the conviction? After a Massachusetts court con-
victed Michelle Carter of involuntary manslaughter following the suicide of her 
boyfriend Conrad Roy in 2014, the answer seemed to be “yes.” Although 
Carter’s conviction—which focused on the content of her text messages—was a 
first-of-its-kind, that was not the case for long. Just five years later, the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts brought similar charges against Inyoung You for 
causing the suicide of her boyfriend, Alexander Urtula, also via text. Although 
the facts in the two cases are not identical, they both raise the question of wheth-
er the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects this type of speech. The 
United States is built upon a foundation that safeguards freedom of speech. There 
are important limits, however, on just how far that protection extends. In 2016, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter focused 
on a First Amendment carveout—speech integral to criminal conduct—when 
convicting Carter of involuntary manslaughter. But as critics have emphasized, 
that was arguably a stretch of the exception. This Note argues that, although the 
reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was not terribly convinc-
ing, criminalizing speech that encourages another person’s suicide can be consti-
tutional. Ultimately, Massachusetts’s proposed bill, aptly named Conrad’s Law, 
which criminalizes this type of speech and conduct, could both eliminate future 
First Amendment questions and protect those struggling with mental illnesses. 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 12, 2014, Michelle Carter engaged in a text message conversa-
tion with her then-boyfriend Conrad Roy, an exchange that resulted in Roy’s 
unfortunate death and Carter’s criminal conviction.2 What began with, “Con-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Exhibit 30 at 175, Commonwealth v. Michelle Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (Mass. Juv. Ct. June 
17, 2017), https://htv-prod-media.s3.amazonaws.com/files/carter-exhibit-30-1497356322.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U7B2-S46F]. 
 2 See id. at 172–73. Michelle Carter was charged with involuntary manslaughter after encourag-
ing Conrad Roy to commit suicide. Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter I), 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 
2016), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). When reaching its indictment, the grand jury focused on 
the texts sent by Carter to Roy “in the minutes, days, weeks, and months” leading up to Roy’s suicide. 
Id. at 1057. Carter appealed her conviction, which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed 
in 2019. See Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 562 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 910 (2020). The judge sentenced her to fifteen months in prison and five years of probation, but 
she secured release after spending less than a year behind bars for “good behavior.” Elisha Fieldstadt, 
Michelle Carter, Convicted in Texting Suicide Case, Released from Jail, NBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020), 
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rad! Hey you there?” quickly turned into Carter’s asking Roy, “Why haven’t 
you done it yet tho?” and her telling him, “You’re just making it harder on 
yourself by pushing it off, you just have to do it.”3 As the text transcript shows, 
Carter actively encouraged Roy to follow through with his suicide plan more 
than twenty times over the course of approximately fourteen hours.4 Notably, 
this specific conversation was just one among many in which Carter encour-
aged Roy to take his own life.5 
Nearly five years later, in a strikingly similar situation, Alexander Urtula 
lost his life and another set of text messages, sent by Inyoung You, is at the 
center of the case.6 Text transcripts indicated that You repeatedly told Urtula to 
“go kill himself” and “go die” when she knew he was depressed and suicidal.7 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michelle-carter-convicted-texting-suicide-case-released-jail-
n1120411 [https://perma.cc/E9EZ-ULZN]. For clarification purposes, this Note discusses two Com-
monwealth v. Carter cases that were heard in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court—one in 2016 
and in one in 2019, affirming the 2016 decision—but collectively refers to both decisions as Com-
monwealth v. Carter. See infra notes 3–226 and accompanying text. 
 3 See Exhibit 30, supra note 1, at 172–73. 
 4 See id. at 172–75 (providing a transcript of the text messages between Roy and Carter, illustrat-
ing the number of texts where Carter encouraged Roy to kill himself). Examples of the suicide-
encouraging texts are: “Do it now like early”; “You just need to do it Conrad”; and “The time is right 
and you’re ready, you just need to do it! You can’t keep living this way. You just need to do it like 
you did last time and not think about it and just do it babe. You can’t keep doing this everyday.” Id. at 
174, 175. 
 5 Paul LeBlanc, The Text Messages That Led Up to Teen’s Suicide, CNN (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/08/us/text-message-suicide-michelle-carter-conrad-roy/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/D93K-URY6]. The text messages began with Carter’s encouraging Roy to seek 
medical attention for suicidal thoughts but progressed to her coaxing Roy into following through with 
his suicide. See id. (providing a curated transcript of texts between Carter and Roy from June 19, 2014 
to July 12, 2014).  
 6 See Press Release, Renee Algarin, Deputy Press Sec’y, Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., Former 
BC Student Indicted for Boyfriend’s Suicide (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/
press-releases/items/2019/10/28/former-bc-student-indicted-for-boyfriends-suicide?rq=inyoung%20
you [https://perma.cc/VD4E-3NWJ] [hereinafter Press Release, Algarin 1] (detailing the alleged facts 
supporting a charge of involuntary manslaughter against Inyoung You for sending suicide-
encouraging texts to Alexander Urtula). But see Emily Sweeney, Transcript of Text Messages Be-
tween Inyoung You and Alexander Urtula, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.
com/metro/2019/11/19/transcript-text-messages-between-inyoung-you-and-alex-urtula/0z9izqMqHR
4xX5XGT0rplM/story.html?p1=Article_Inline_Text_Link [https://perma.cc/V6TZ-G9UE] (showing 
text messages between You and Urtula on the day of his suicide that paint a loving and considerate 
relationship). On January 14, 2021, the Massachusetts Superior Court denied You’s motion to dismiss, 
allowing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to move forward with its “manslaughter by commis-
sion” theory. Press Release, Renee Algarin, Deputy Press Sec’y, Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 
Court Ruling Allows Inyoung You Prosecution to Proceed (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.suffolk
districtattorney.com/press-releases/items/inyoung-you-prosecution-proceed [https://perma.cc/QM2E-
DUMS] [hereinafter Press Release, Algarin 2]. Under this theory, the Commonwealth argues that 
You’s words (and texts) could have been the cause of Urtula’s suicide. Id. The Superior Court, how-
ever, did eliminate the Commonwealth’s “manslaughter by omission” theory—that You caused Ur-
tula’s death by failing to seek help—by granting the corresponding motion to dismiss. Id. 
 7 Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6. 
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You was even present when Urtula jumped to his death from a parking garage.8 
Although Commonwealth v. Carter and Commonwealth v. You are factually 
distinct in some ways, a common question that places the two in conversation 
is whether the speech at issue—text messages encouraging another’s suicide—
can and should be criminalized without running afoul of the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution.9 
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, allowing individuals 
to speak freely without the fear of government intervention.10 But this guaran-
tee also has important limits, and not all types of speech receive the same level 
of protection.11 The U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts has 
taken an extremely speech-protective stance.12 This approach, however, has 
not been immune from strong criticism.13 Specifically, opponents have ques-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See id. (noting that You tracked Urtula’s phone in the moments leading up to his suicide). 
 9 See Erin Tiernan, Expert: Michelle Carter, Inyoung You Cases ‘Weaken’ First Amendment, BOS. 
HERALD (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/10/28/expert-michelle-carter-inyoung-
you-cases-weaken-first-amendment/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20201028180151/https://www.boston
herald.com/2019/10/28/expert-michelle-carter-inyoung-you-cases-weaken-first-amendment/] (providing 
one expert’s view on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s implications of these two cases). 
The Suffolk County District Attorney acknowledges the similarities in both cases but views the case 
against You as stronger than the case against Carter because You was physically present when Urtula 
jumped from a parking garage. Id. 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 11 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (explaining that speech pertaining to purely 
private issues does not warrant the same level of protection as speech on public matters, which con-
tributes to important public debates and ideas); see also Lauren E. Beausoleil, Note, Free, Hateful, 
and Posted: Rethinking First Amendment Protection of Hate Speech in a Social Media World, 60 B.C. 
L. REV. 2101, 2112 (2019) (introducing categories of speech that are excluded from free speech pro-
tection). These categories include obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to 
criminal conduct. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010). Part I of this Note discusses 
these First Amendment limitations in greater detail. See infra notes 21–97 and accompanying text. 
 12 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L. & 
POL’Y 63, 64 (2016) (providing an analysis of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions implicating the 
First Amendment). Joel Gora argues that the Roberts Court is the “most speech-protective Court in a 
generation.” Id.; see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–69, 472 (upholding the unconstitutionality of a 
statute outlawing depictions of animal cruelty). In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Stevens under Chief Justice Roberts held that animal cruelty depictions did not fit within a category 
unprotected by the First Amendment; the Court further noted that banning these depictions was con-
sequently presumed to be invalid as a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny balancing. 559 
U.S. at 468. Under strict scrutiny, the government must prove that a compelling interest exists and that 
the speech restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve its stated interest. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 
U.S. 155, 171 (2015). The Court also refused to declare a new category of unprotected speech and set 
a high bar for establishing new categories going forward. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472 (stating that the 
Court does not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of 
the First Amendment”). 
 13 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 490–91 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s decision to inval-
idate the ruling as overly broad). Justice Alito pointed specifically to the “constitutionally permissible 
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tioned whether such a speech-protective posture actually fulfills the purpose of 
the First Amendment or wrongly pushes aside other important societal val-
ues.14 
This Note argues that, even against the current Supreme Court’s posture, 
criminalizing speech that encourages another person to commit suicide can be 
constitutional when limits are set.15 Part I of this Note provides an analysis of 
the First Amendment, including exceptions to free speech protection, and dis-
cusses how technological changes present challenges to traditional First 
Amendment doctrine.16 Part II then introduces the Carter and You cases.17 Part 
II also presents the First Amendment arguments for and against eliminating 
free speech protection in the context of text messages that encourage another 
to commit suicide.18 Finally, Part III analyzes the shortcomings of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Carter, including its controver-
sial use of First Amendment carveouts and failure to emphasize the purely pri-
vate nature of Carter’s speech.19 In arguing in favor of Carter’s criminal con-
viction, Part III also illustrates the constitutionality of Massachusetts’s pro-
posed law criminalizing suicide-encouraging speech, which would eliminate 
similar First Amendment questions in the future.20 
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THEN AND NOW 
In the wake of the Michelle Carter and Inyoung You cases, the press and 
legal scholars once again ignited debates surrounding the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and the importance of protected speech.21 To many, the 
                                                                                                                           
applications” of the statute, and he argued that the Court must not only look in absolute terms. Id. at 
491. 
 14 See Gora, supra note 12, at 64–65 (noting that decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court regard-
ing free speech protection have been heavily criticized by outsiders to the Court as well as Justices on 
the bench); see also, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 426–27 (2010) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing the original drafters’ narrower view of protected 
speech in the context of corporations, and disagreeing with the Court’s decision to grant this high 
level of speech protection to corporations). Three prevailing rationales exist that inform the purpose of 
the First Amendment: the “marketplace of ideas,” “self-governance,” and “self-fulfillment/autonomy.” 
See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9–14 (5th ed. 2016) (emphasis omitted). 
Critics have argued that such a speech-protective stance pushes aside other important values, includ-
ing privacy, equality, and decency. Gora, supra note 12, at 64–65. 
 15 See infra notes 180–226 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 21–97 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 98–137 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 138–179 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 180–212 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 213–226 and accompanying text. 
 21 See, e.g., Tiernan, supra note 9 (providing a First Amendment expert’s opinion on how these 
two cases weaken free speech protection). Michelle Carter’s legal team also challenged the decision 
for weakening the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
2021] When Suicide-Encouraging Texts Are Not Constitutionally Protected 1021 
notion of criminalizing speech in the form of text messages runs afoul of the 
very basis of free speech protection.22 To more fully understand the role of the 
First Amendment in these two cases—and future cases that may invoke similar 
issues—Section A of this Part provides an overview of the First Amendment, 
including its history and doctrinal evolution.23 Against the historical pro-
speech backdrop, Section B discusses key limitations created by the U.S. Su-
preme Court that cut against absolute speech protection.24 Finally, Section C 
focuses on the intersection between technological advancements and the First 
Amendment, including whether traditional understandings of free speech can, 
or should, be applied to modern-day questions.25 
A. The Evolution of the First Amendment 
Although Congress passed the First Amendment in 1791, it was not until 
1919 that the U.S. Supreme Court began to truly mold the meaning of free 
speech.26 At its core, the First Amendment prevents Congress from passing a 
law abridging an individual’s speech and expression.27 In 1919, in Schenck v. 
United States, however, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the U.S. Supreme 
Court explicitly placed important limits on this guaranteed right for the first 
time.28 Schenck involved the distribution of documents intended to undermine 
                                                                                                                           
Court rejected the argument. See Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 562 (Mass. 
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020). 
 22 See Robby Soave, Opinion, Michelle Carter Didn’t Kill with a Text, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/michelle-carter-didnt-kill-with-a-text.html [https://perma.
cc/Z4K3-442E] (arguing that although Carter’s conduct was morally wrong, there was nothing illegal 
about her sending the text messages encouraging Conrad Roy to commit suicide); Tiernan, supra note 
9 (illustrating the disapproval of Harvey Silverglate, an expert in civil rights and constitutional law, of 
the outcome in Commonwealth v. Carter, commenting that free speech is almost “absolute”).  
 23 See infra notes 26–41 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 42–81 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 82–97 and accompanying text. 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Olivia B. Waxman, The Freedom of the Press Is Enshrined in the First 
Amendment—But What That Means Has Changed, TIME (May 3, 2019), https://time.com/5580170/
first-amendment-press-freedom-history/ [https://perma.cc/5M8Y-5UYF]. The First Amendment ap-
plies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 
(2015); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925). The year 1919 is referred to as the start of 
“The Free Speech Century,” as it was the first year in which the U.S. Supreme Court began to develop 
and define First Amendment doctrine. Waxman, supra (emphasis omitted). The underlying purpose of 
the First Amendment, as defined by the Court is to allow for the spread of ideas, public debate, and 
individual self-expression. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).  
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (recognizing 
that the purpose of the First Amendment is to limit governmental constraints on free speech and ex-
pression). 
 28 See 249 U.S. at 52 (holding that speech that is typically constitutionally protected may not 
receive that same high level of protection if the circumstances do not permit). In 1919, in Schenck v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court illustrated this notion by providing the example of a man in a 
theatre shouting that there is a fire simply to cause panic. Id. The Court explained that protection of 
free speech would not, even in its strictest form, protect this speech. Id. 
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the draft during World War I.29 The Supreme Court ruled that the First 
Amendment did not protect the speech in these documents.30 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court emphasized the importance of context, articulating that 
the question to be asked in every case is whether the words used in that specif-
ic circumstance create a “clear and present danger” that Congress is authorized 
to prevent.31 The U.S. Supreme Court confirmed this approach in 1919 in both 
Frohwerk v. United States32 and Debs v. United States.33 
Between the 1920s and 1960s, the Supreme Court was relatively incon-
sistent in its treatment of free speech.34 For example, in 1927, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Whitney v. California loosened the proximity requirement of a 
“clear and present danger,” cutting against broad protection of speech.35 Con-
versely, in 1952, the Court in Burstyn v. Wilson decided to broaden free speech 
protection beyond traditional speech by holding that the First Amendment does 
in fact capture expression found in motion pictures.36 After years of turbulent 
treatment, the tide shifted in 1964 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and laid the foundation for a precedent that sus-
tained strong free speech protection.37 In addition to emphasizing the im-
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. at 48–49. 
 30 Id. at 52–53. The Schenck Court convicted the defendants under the Espionage Act for distrib-
uting documents intended to undermine the draft when the United States was at war with Germany. 
Id. at 48–49, 53. The documents said things such as “a conscript is little better than a convict” and 
“your right to assert your opposition to the draft.” Id. at 50–51. 
 31 Id. at 52. The Supreme Court articulated that it is “a question of proximity and degree.” Id. 
 32 See 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (stating that the purpose of the First Amendment was not to pro-
tect every single use of language). 
 33 See 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919) (holding that an anti-war proclamation was not protected 
speech because its purpose was to disrupt recruitment for the war effort). 
 34 See Waxman, supra note 26 (presenting an overview of the evolution of First Amendment 
doctrine). The Supreme Court issued many very pro-speech decisions in the 1930s, but governmental 
attempts to control Communist messaging resulted in a downtick of this trend. Id. 
 35 See 274 U.S. 357, 374–75 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (articulating that whether there is a 
“clear and present danger” must be determined based on the time and circumstances), overruled per 
curiam by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 344 (1969). In 1927, in Whitney v. California, the U.S. 
Supreme Court convicted the defendant, Charlotte Anita Whitney, under the California Criminal Syn-
dicalism Act for her ties to the Communist party after the Court determined that the Act was not an 
unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the state’s police power. Id. at 359, 369, 371 (majority opinion). 
Consequently, there was no free speech violation either. Id. at 371. The Supreme Court eventually 
overturned Whitney. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. 
 36 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (reasoning that because motion pictures communicate ideas, they 
are within the scope of the First Amendment). A motion picture distributor challenged a New York 
state statute allowing for sacrilegious films to be banned. Id. at 497. In 1952, in Burstyn v. Wilson, the 
U.S. Supreme Court also noted that even though motion pictures can introduce more evil to society 
than traditional communications, that fact alone does not exclude motion pictures from First Amend-
ment protection. Id. at 502. 
 37 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964); see, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010) 
(upholding the unconstitutionality of a statute outlawing depictions of animal cruelty); see also Wax-
man, supra note 26 (arguing that New York Times Co. v. Sullivan stood for an extremely speech-
protective stance). 
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portance of public debate in American society by ruling that a public official 
cannot bring a libel action without showing actual malice, the majority also 
underscored the Court’s dedication to protecting against “forbidden intru-
sion[s] on the field of free expression.”38 
This speech-protective stance continued over the decades and carried 
through to the present-day Roberts Court.39 To some, today’s Supreme Court is 
among the most free-speech protective Courts in U.S. history.40 Not only has 
the Supreme Court issued decisions that value free speech over other societal 
interests, the Court has, up to this point, also refused to create new categories 
of speech excluded from First Amendment protection.41 
B. Constraints on First Amendment Protection: Exclusions,  
Strict Scrutiny, and Purely Private Speech 
Although the Supreme Court’s modern-day approach is highly speech 
protective, the Court still follows the important and firmly rooted limits that 
have shaped First Amendment doctrine over time.42 This Section introduces 
the types of speech that are categorically excluded from free speech protection 
as well as the strict scrutiny balancing test that applies to other types of con-
tent-based restrictions.43 This Section also explains the varying degrees of pro-
tection available to speech of public versus purely private concern.44 
1. Categorical Exclusions from Free Speech Protection 
The basic premise of the First Amendment is that the government does 
not have the right to interfere with an individual’s expression stemming from 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285. In Sullivan, the plaintiff, an elected commissioner, brought libel 
claims against the defendant, The New York Times, after it published an advertisement that negatively 
referred to the plaintiff without being completely factually true. Id. at 257–58. The U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim because there was no showing of “actual malice.” Id. at 281, 284. 
 39 Waxman, supra note 26. 
 40 See Gora, supra note 12, at 68 (listing notable attempts by the government to regulate speech, 
including violent video games, animal cruelty, and fabrication of military honors, all of which the 
Supreme Court rejected). 
 41 See VICTORIA L. KILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11072, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CATEGO-
RIES OF SPEECH 1–2 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11072.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NCF-MGSV] 
(identifying the unprotected speech categories as obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, true 
threats, fighting words, child pornography, and speech integral to criminal conduct); Gora, supra note 
12, at 65–66 (arguing that values such as privacy, equality, decency, and democracy have been pushed 
aside to uphold a pro-speech approach); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (holding 
that speech cannot be restricted because it is merely upsetting). 
 42 See Gora, supra note 12, at 64 (arguing that the Roberts Court is one of the most pro-speech 
Courts in history); Beausoleil, supra note 11, at 2114 (explaining that different kinds of speech re-
ceive disparate treatment and listing the categories of unprotected speech). 
 43 See infra notes 45–73 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text. 
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that person’s ideas and beliefs, even if the government disagrees or finds the 
speech distasteful or offensive.45 But free speech is by no means absolute; over 
time, the Supreme Court has established well-recognized categories that are 
excluded from First Amendment protection altogether.46 These categories in-
clude obscenity, defamation, fraudulent speech leading to deception, incite-
ment, fighting words, true threats, speech integral to criminal conduct, and 
child pornography.47 Because of the low social value these categories of 
speech provide, the Court has concluded that they are outside the bounds of the 
First Amendment’s protections.48 
In the context of speech encouraging another to commit suicide, the most 
relevant categories of exclusion are fighting words, true threats, and speech 
integral to criminal conduct.49 
a. A Closer Look: Fighting Words 
The Supreme Court has defined fighting words to mean words that “in-
flict injury” or cause an “immediate breach of peace.”50 When the Court first 
construed the term, it implied that fighting words were not within the scope of 
the First Amendment because they were not considered speech at all.51 More 
recently, however, the Court has stepped away from this notion and the doc-
trine has evolved significantly.52 The Supreme Court has stressed the require-
ment that the words be directed to an individual in a face-to-face context.53 
Furthermore, the Court has been increasingly hesitant to turn to the fighting 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); see Beausoleil, supra note 11, at 
2113 (stating that the “bedrock” of the First Amendment is that the government cannot restrict speech 
because it finds the speech offensive). 
 46 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–67 (1925) (affirming that free speech protection, 
although guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, is not absolute). In 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, the 
U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized the reasonable limits that are needed to ensure that individuals 
do not abuse the privilege afforded by free speech protection and to preserve the ability of the states 
and the government to punish when it is abused. Id. at 677; see Beausoleil, supra note 11, at 2113 
(reinforcing that free speech is not absolute and has been limited by the Supreme Court over time). 
 47 KILLION, supra note 41, at 1–2. 
 48 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is of 
such low societal value because the interest of order in society outweighs any possible benefit). 
 49 See infra notes 50–66 and accompanying text. 
 50 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 51 Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1527 
(1993); see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571, 573 (articulating that fighting words are not a way to express 
ideas). In 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[r]esort to 
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safe-
guarded by the Constitution.” Id. at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 
(1940)). 
 52 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (articulating that even categorically unprotected speech must be 
viewed in context when assessing the applicability of First Amendment protection). 
 53 Mannheimer, supra note 51, at 1551. 
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words doctrine to restrict speech for its content alone, instead focusing on the 
context.54 Although the doctrine has changed since its origination and legal 
scholars have cast doubt on the true purpose of this exclusion, the Court con-
tinues to recognize fighting words among those categories of speech excluded 
from First Amendment protection.55 
b. A Closer Look: True Threats 
Similar to the fighting words exclusion, the Supreme Court has placed 
significant limitations on what is considered a true threat, and thus outside the 
bounds of First Amendment protection.56 The Court defines true threats as 
statements indicating that the speaker intends to commit an act of violence 
against a person or group.57 This restriction does not simply protect individuals 
from violent acts, but it also protects them from fear of violence and the ensu-
ing disruption this fear is likely to cause.58 Similar to fighting words, there has 
been debate about what true threats actually encompass and how to determine 
when speech fits into this category.59 Most courts apply an objective standard 
when they look at the context and content of the speech to determine if a rea-
sonable person would perceive the speech as a true threat.60 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. at 1546–48. 
 55 See STONE ET AL., supra note 14, at 84 (recognizing that various decisions cite the fighting 
words exclusion, including in recent years); Mannheimer, supra note 51, at 1548 (reiterating that 
fighting words is a well-established category of unprotected speech, even amidst changes to the doc-
trine). 
 56 See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
283, 295–96 (2001) (analyzing the factors the Supreme Court suggested when determining whether 
speech rises to the level of a true threat). Because the Court views First Amendment exclusions nar-
rowly, the context, the audience reaction, the dependency of the statement, and the setting in which 
the words were spoken are all relevant factors in the Court’s inquiry. Id. at 295, 298. 
 57 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia v. 
Black held that the Commonwealth of Virginia was legally authorized to prohibit individuals from 
burning crosses as a form of intimidation under the true threats exclusion. Id. at 357, 363.  
 58 Id. at 360. 
 59 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasizing that words argua-
bly categorized as true threats must be considered in context to determine if the speech rises to this 
level of threatening). In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court in Watts v. United States ultimately determined 
that defendant Robert Watts’s statement to kill the President if forced to take part in the war effort was 
not a true threat because it was conditional and in the context of a larger political debate. Id. at 707; 
see Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 
541, 543 (2004) (examining the gray area that exists when threats are made outside of a neutral set-
ting, such as in the context of political debate). 
 60 Elrod, supra note 59, at 577–78; see also Beausoleil, supra note 11, at 2121 (illustrating what 
courts consider when examining threats, which includes context, “reactions of listeners, the nature of 
the threat, . . . any prior incidents where the speaker had threatened the victim, and any potential rea-
sons for the recipient of the threat to believe that the speaker had violent propensities”). 
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c. A Closer Look: Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct61 
In its simplest terms, speech integral to criminal conduct refers to speech 
that is central to violating a criminal statute.62 Speech alone, however, is not 
sufficient to constitute this type of expression; rather, the speech has to cause 
or threaten to cause illegal activity.63 Obvious examples include aiding and 
abetting speech leading to murder or sexual abuse.64 Again, there are a number 
of boundaries that the Supreme Court has placed on this exception.65 For in-
stance, telling another person to kill in the abstract (as opposed to killing a par-
ticular victim in a particular way) is protected speech, as is speech lacking spe-
cial knowledge or expertise regarding the commission of a crime.66 
Because these categories of speech—fighting words, true threats, and 
speech integral to criminal conduct—are of such minimal social value, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Because laws regarding assisted suicide vary among the states, whether a state has a law in 
effect criminalizing this conduct is a relevant part of the discussion. For an overview of state laws that 
prohibit assisted suicide, see ROBERT RIVAS, FINAL EXIT NETWORK, SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 
AGAINST ASSISTING IN A SUICIDE (2019), http://hstrial-004jedic.homestead.com/Survey_of_State_
Laws_Against_Assisting_in_a_Suicide_2019_update.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/202002150
82151/http://www.finalexitnetwork.org/Survey_of_State_Laws_Against_Assisting_in_a_Suicide_
2019_update.pdf]. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin all have statutes that 
criminalize aiding another person’s suicide. Id. Notably, Massachusetts does not. See id. For the states 
that do criminalize aiding or assisting with another’s suicide, those statutes have passed constitutional 
muster. Id. For example, in 2016, in State v. Final Exit Network, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Minne-
sota upheld a criminal conviction against the defendant, Final Exit Network, for violating the state’s 
assisted suicide law. 889 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016). The court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because the statute only as-
signed criminal liability when another person provides an individual with the tools necessary to com-
mit suicide—whether through verbal instruction or conduct. Id. at 301. In this case, the defendant 
assisted through verbal instructions by providing information on what supplies to buy and how to 
carry out the suicide. Id. at 300. The Minnesota court’s decision reiterated that narrowly tailored stat-
utes criminalizing assisting in another person’s suicide—even through verbal means—can withstand a 
strict scrutiny inquiry. See id. at 303. 
 62 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 63 See Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 981, 1051 (2016) (providing a high-level overview of the Supreme Court’s understanding of 
speech integral to criminal conduct). 
 64 Id. at 986. These are clear examples of speech integral to criminal conduct because the conduct 
itself is illegal. Id. at 986, 993. 
 65 Id. at 986, 993. An example of a limitation of the exception is that this category does not apply 
when the speech itself is a violation of the law. Id. at 986–87.  
 66 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 1997) (drawing a distinction be-
tween speech that provides a play-by-play of how to commit a crime—in this context murder by a 
hitman—with speech that abstractly encourages criminal activity); Volokh, supra note 63, at 993–94 
(emphasizing the difference between speech that targets a specific victim and speech that alludes to 
more abstract killing). 
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has historically excluded them from First Amendment protection.67 Therefore, 
when speech or expression falls within one of these categories, it is unnecessary 
to weigh competing interests, unlike other content-based restrictions.68 
2. Applicable Balancing Test Applied to Other Content-Based Restrictions 
Although courts typically presume that content-based restrictions outside 
of the established categorical exclusions are invalid under the First Amend-
ment, the strict scrutiny balancing test provides a mechanism for restricting 
speech on an ad hoc basis because of the content itself.69 Under this test, the 
government bears the burden of showing that the speech restriction at issue is 
narrowly tailored in a way that promotes a compelling government interest.70 
The Supreme Court has recognized various interests that may rise to this level 
of compelling, including preventing sex and race discrimination, maintaining a 
stable political system, and ensuring that criminals do not profit from their 
crimes.71 
If the government prevails under a strict scrutiny inquiry, then the gov-
ernment may place restrictions on the time, place, and manner of the speech.72 
This power of the government further illustrates the non-absolute nature of 
speech protection while simultaneously emphasizing the high threshold the 
government must overcome before impeding on an individual’s First Amend-
ment rights.73 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–71 (2010) (emphasizing the Court’s long-
recognized practice of excluding certain categories of speech when they have minimal social value). 
 68 See id. at 470 (articulating the importance of restricting the evil encompassed by categories of 
unprotected speech, even when there may be competing interests that relate to free expression). 
 69 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 386 (1992) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court has upheld content-based restrictions that limit the time, place, or manner of speech). 
 70 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). When a court applies the strict scrutiny test 
to a content-based restriction, the government’s motive is irrelevant to the inquiry. Id. at 164–65. The 
government needs to identify a compelling state interest and prove that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 163. A regulation is narrowly tailored when it is neither under-
inclusive nor overinclusive, meaning that the regulation neither encompasses too much nor too little. 
Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987). In 2015, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
the government did not satisfy the strict scrutiny test because the regulation was underinclusive. 576 
U.S. at 172. Instead of banning all outdoor signs for aesthetic and safety concerns, the regulation only 
banned certain signs (ideological and political signs) but not others (temporary directional signs). Id. 
at 159. 
 71 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2420–21 (1996). 
 72 Beausoleil, supra note 11, at 2113. 
 73 See Volokh, supra note 71, at 2421–23 (noting that the “narrowly tailored” prong of the strict 
scrutiny test sets an extremely high bar). To satisfy this prong, a court must find that the measure 
actually advances the government’s interest, that the measure is not overinclusive or underinclusive, 
and that there is no less restrictive measure that would satisfy the governmental interest. Id. 
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3. Speech of Public Versus Purely Private Concern 
The Supreme Court also has articulated that the level of protection war-
ranted by certain speech can vary depending on whether it is of public or pure-
ly private concern.74 According to the Court, speech concerning public matters 
warrants the highest level of protection, whereas speech of private concern 
does not automatically receive this presumption.75 When speech relates to a 
matter of public concern, the arguably controversial or offensive nature of the 
speech is irrelevant because this type of speech is “at the heart of the First 
Amendment.”76 
The difficulty lies in determining when, in fact, speech is of public or pri-
vate concern.77 Guidance from the Supreme Court does provide some im-
portant boundaries, but the public versus private distinction is often not a clear-
cut determination.78 Generally speaking, if the speech in question relates to a 
concern of the community—whether it be social, political, or of some other 
relevance—it constitutes public speech and is worthy of the highest level of 
protection.79 This often includes speech of general interest as well.80 Speech of 
purely private concern, on the contrary, does not warrant this heightened level 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (stating that speech relating to public mat-
ters warrants special protection because it is among the most valued speech protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 75 Id. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps broadly defined speech of public con-
cern to mean “‘relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’ or when 
it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and con-
cern to the public.’” Id. at 453 (citation omitted) (first quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 
(1983); and then quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam)). Speech 
that is purely private in nature, on the other hand, is “of less First Amendment concern.” Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985). 
 76 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451–52 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 
(1978)). The Snyder Court explained purely private speech is often afforded “less rigorous” protec-
tion. Id. at 452. 
 77 See id. at 453 (stating that a court must independently examine the content, form, and context 
of the speech when determining whether it is of public or private concern); W. Robert Gray, Public 
and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Convergence in Free-Speech Values, 1 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) (underscoring the challenge that both lowers courts and the Supreme 
Court has had in drawing a distinction between private and public speech). Beginning in the 1970s, 
the Court attempted to bucket speech into two categories: low-value private speech versus high-value 
public speech. Gray, supra, at 3–4. 
 78 See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454 (weighing the content, form, and context of the Westboro Baptist 
Church signs used to picket a military funeral to communicate their beliefs on homosexuality). The 
Court reasoned that the content (signs that read, “F[*]g Troops”) was of public concern but the con-
text (at a funeral) was private. Id. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned the speech was of public concern 
when viewed in totality of the circumstances, and therefore concluded that the highest level of protec-
tion under the First Amendment applied to the speech. Id. at 458. The fact that it was upsetting was 
not enough to warrant an intrusion on the picketers’ First Amendment rights. Id. 
 79 Id. at 453. 
 80 Id. 
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of protection because it does not threaten public debate or important dialogue 
on public matters.81 
C. Technology, Its Impact on Communication, and the First Amendment 
Undoubtedly, technology has complicated the original interpretations of the 
First Amendment, including its protections and exceptions.82 Technological in-
novation has had a profound impact on the ways in which people communi-
cate.83 Consequently, modern-day communication presents an opportunity to 
rethink the existing First Amendment framework shaped by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and whether and how the historical exclusions apply.84 As individuals are 
able to reach more people than ever before with a click of a button by posting a 
status update on Facebook or sending out a public Tweet, face-to-face interaction 
has drastically decreased.85 Furthermore, it is not uncommon for relationships to 
begin or indefinitely remain online, consequently changing how people build 
these personal connections, whether they are in romantic or platonic settings.86 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. at 452. The Snyder Court reasoned that because restricting private speech does not raise the 
“same constitutional concerns,” including interfering with public debate and the spread of ideas, it 
does not need to be as heavily protected. Id. 
 82 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Candides and Cassandras: Technology and Free Speech on the Rob-
erts Court, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1327, 1345–46 (2018) (illustrating the Supreme Court’s hesitation in 
addressing First Amendment questions relating to technology, but noting the impact of technology on 
speech). As of 2018, the Roberts Court only squarely addressed free speech and the internet in one 
decision—Packingham v. North Carolina. Id. at 1328–29. In 2017, in Packingham, the U.S. Supreme 
Court invalidated a North Carolina statute that made it illegal for registered sex offenders to access 
certain websites, including social media sites, used by minors. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733, 1738 (2017). 
The Court noted that even though parks and streets are still essential forums for people to voice their 
opinions and listen to others, the internet must also be added to this list. Id. at 1735. Furthermore, the 
Court emphasized the importance of social media in allowing people to “engage in a wide array of 
protected First Amendment activity.” Id. at 1735–36. 
 83 Pimenov Maxim, How Internet Changed the Way We Communicate, ENGADGET (Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.engadget.com/2016/11/29/how-internet-changed-the-way-we-communicate/ [https://perma.
cc/8DC6-F9QT]. As of October 2020, nearly 59% of the world’s population uses the internet. Joseph 
Johnson, Global Digital Population as of October 2020, STATISTA (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.
statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/SCV4-J79X]. 
 84 See Bhagwat, supra note 82 at 1349 (implying the tension the Court will likely face when try-
ing to uphold traditional First Amendment doctrine, but grappling with the reality that new technolo-
gies bring); Maxim, supra note 83 (articulating the ways in which the internet, in particular, has 
changed means of communication). 
 85 See Maxim, supra note 83 (arguing that the rise of the internet and social media impacts peo-
ple’s relationships and how they communicate with others by using technology). For instance, it is 
now possible to create and maintain relationships without ever meeting in-person. Id. 
 86 See This Is How Technology Is Affecting Your Relationship, HUFFPOST (Oct. 19, 2014), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/technology-changing-relationships_n_5884042 [https://perma.cc/
QP2K-GVLR] (providing ways in which technology is changing personal relationships, including 
existing relationships and new relationships formed over the internet). Today, relationships either 
formed or maintained online appear to move along quicker and in-person meetings are delayed. Id. 
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Today, people can learn about one another through texting, video-chatting, and 
social media, for example, all without ever meeting in person.87 
Although the ability to communicate with others through technological 
means does provide important benefits, there are also major concerns that ac-
company technology.88 For instance, with the growth of the internet, including 
social media, cyberbullying continues to be commonplace.89 The effects of 
cyberbullying can often be devastating, especially on teens.90 Additionally, in 
relationships, technology provides people with tools to harass, scare, and in-
timidate their friends or partners.91 Not only can abusers use technology to 
control victims through constant oversight and a “virtual presence,” they can 
also use technology to isolate victims and punish or humiliate them.92 
Technology is here to stay and these concerns cannot be completely elim-
inated.93 But what role can, and should, the government play in addressing 
these problems?94 Especially regarding communication in the modern era, the 
First Amendment provides an important shield for speech expressed over cy-
berspace.95 Commonwealth v. Carter and Commonwealth v. You, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id.; see Maxim, supra note 83. 
 88 See Romeo Vitelli, Does Technology Make Bullying Easier?, PSYCH. TODAY (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/media-spotlight/201604/does-technology-make-bullying-
easier [https://perma.cc/FWV3-XEL8] (examining how technology has contributed to the growing 
instances of cyberbullying and anonymous harassment campaigns). 
 89 Id. Studies show that between 10% and 35% of young people experience cyberbullying. Id. 
 90 See id. (indicating that cyberbullying victims have, on many occasions, committed suicide 
because of the abuse they experienced online). 
 91 Wendy L. Patrick, Remote Controlled: Domestic Abuse Through Technology, PSYCH. TODAY 
(July 22, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-bad-looks-good/201807/remote-
controlled-domestic-abuse-through-technology [https://perma.cc/F5BK-5874]. 
 92 See id. (providing specific examples of the ways abusers can use technology to harm their vic-
tims). Examples of abuse include threatening to expose intimate photos, tracking the victims’ loca-
tions for stalking purposes, and constantly calling and texting people against their will. Id. In 2016, in 
Commonwealth v. Carter, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court emphasized Carter’s “virtual 
presence,” which was made possible through texting. Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter I), 52 N.E.3d 
1054, 1063 (Mass. 2016), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). Although Carter was not physically 
present at the time of Roy’s suicide, she was virtually present and able to coerce Roy through her use 
of technology. Id. 
 93 See Bhagwat, supra note 82 at 1349–50 (articulating challenges faced by the Supreme Court in 
the wake of technological developments as it concerns the First Amendment, including social media 
and minors, privacy on the internet, and “fake news”). 
 94 Staci Garber, Freedom of Speech? A Lesson on Understanding the Protections and Limits of 
the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/learning/
lesson-plans/freedom-of-speech-a-lesson-on-understanding-the-protections-and-limits-of-the-first-
amendment.html [https://perma.cc/8QHS-B8F2] (encouraging individuals to grapple with the question 
of when or if the government should regulate speech in various situations). 
 95 See Barry R. Schaller, The First Amendment in the Digital Age: Protecting Free Speech (and 
Other Values), 25 SACRED HEART U. REV. 60, 66 (2009) (positing that because the meaning of the 
First Amendment has changed over time, courts and lawmakers should adapt the doctrine to fit mod-
ern-day situations, including concerns surrounding the internet). For example, it is nearly impossible 
for the fighting words exclusion to apply to cyber communications, as the parties involved may never 
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have taken the communications in question outside of free speech protection 
and into the realm of criminal culpability.96 The question remaining is whether 
this is the correct, and constitutional, approach.97 
II. ADDRESSING THE CLASH: WHAT IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S  
PLACE IN COMMONWEALTH V. CARTER? 
In 2016, in Commonwealth v. Carter, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court convicted Michelle Carter of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced 
her to fifteen months in prison.98 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts argued 
that Carter’s wanton or reckless conduct—her text messages and phone calls—
caused Conrad Roy’s death.99 Carter’s lawyers fought back, arguing that words 
alone cannot ever rise to this level of wantonness or recklessness.100 The Su-
preme Judicial Court acknowledged that this was, in a sense, a case of first 
impression because the court had never been asked to rule on a manslaughter 
charge where the conduct at issue was speech alone.101 The court ultimately 
sided with the Commonwealth and held that speech can, in fact, overcome a 
person’s will to live without running afoul of the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution; Carter’s text messages and phone calls did just that.102 
This Part first describes two cases involving suicide-encouraging texts—
Commonwealth v. Carter and Commonwealth v. You—and later discusses the 
arguments that both support and undermine the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court’s decision in Carter on First Amendment grounds.103 More specifi-
cally, Section A details the key similarities and differences between the two 
cases, including the important First Amendment implications.104 Section B 
then examines the criticism that the Carter decision received, both from the 
defense and outside commentators.105 Finally, Section C delves into the Su-
                                                                                                                           
come face-to-face. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire., 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (illustrating the 
face-to-face nature of fighting words unprotected by the First Amendment). 
 96 See Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1064–65 (convicting Carter of involuntary manslaughter for causing 
her boyfriend’s suicide by text message); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6 (announcing charges 
brought against Inyoung You for her role in Alexander Urtula’s suicide). 
 97 See infra notes 98–226 and accompanying text. 
 98 Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1064–65. 
 99 Id. at 1060–61. 
 100 Id. at 1061. 
 101 Id. at 1061–62. 
 102 Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 570 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 910 (2020); Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1063. 
 103 See infra notes 108–179 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 108–137 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 138–166 and accompanying text. 
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preme Judicial Court’s reasoning that led to Carter’s conviction.106 Notably, 
the focus of this Part is on Carter, as You is still pending.107 
A. Texts Under Fire: Two Tales of Four Teens 
The Carter and You cases both challenge the outer limits of First 
Amendment protection, especially as it pertains to the age of digital communi-
cations.108 Importantly, however, these cases are unlikely to be the only ones 
raising similar First Amendment concerns.109 
Carter and Roy met in 2012 while both teens were on family vacations.110 
Although the teens had met five times face-to-face, most of their romantic rela-
tionship developed over text messages and phone calls.111 After authorities found 
Roy unresponsive in his parked truck on July 13, 2014, a medical examiner con-
cluded that the cause of death was suicide by carbon monoxide poisoning.112 
The investigation into Roy’s apparent suicide led police to Carter.113 After 
looking further into the text messages between Roy and Carter in the weeks 
leading up to Roy’s death, it became clear that Carter was acutely aware of 
Roy’s history of mental illness and prior suicide attempts.114 Beyond this, the 
texts also indicated that Carter actually encouraged Roy to commit suicide by 
talking to him about how to do it, calming his fears about leaving his family 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See infra notes 167–179 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 108–179 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 
6 (illustrating the details currently available to the public). On January 15, 2021, the Suffolk County 
District Attorney issued a press release stating that the office is preparing for trial. The announcement 
followed the Massachusetts Superior Court’s decision to deny Inyoung You’s motion to dismiss on 
the theory that she may have caused Alexander Urtula’s death. Id. The court did, however, agree that 
You did not cause Urtula’s death by failing to seek help. Id.  
 108 See Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 570–72 (Mass. 2019) (addressing 
the case’s free speech issues), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra 
note 6 (highlighting You’s speech that led to Urtula’s suicide). 
 109 See Vitelli, supra note 88 (illustrating the increasing instances of online bullying and the rising 
rates of resulting suicides). 
 110 Gabrielle Bruney, Michelle Carter Was Convicted of Encouraging Her Boyfriend to Kill Him-
self. Here’s What Happened Next., ESQUIRE (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.esquire.com/entertainment/
tv/a28339149/where-michelle-carter-is-now-jail-i-love-you-now-die-true-story/ [https://perma.cc/
XAW2-NTYU]. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter I), 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 2016), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 
559 (Mass. 2019). 
 113 Id. at 1057. After looking into Conrad Roy’s text messages, police decided to examine his 
relationship with Michelle Carter more closely. Id. 
 114 Id. at 1057–58. Both teens had a history of mental health concerns, and they knew of the oth-
er’s struggles. Bruney, supra note 110. Carter had suffered from an eating disorder and Roy made 
prior suicide attempts. Id. The teens talked about their mental illnesses, including depression. Id. In 
addition to the text messages sent by Carter to Roy encouraging him to follow through with his sui-
cide, Carter had urged Roy to go to a mental health hospital for help earlier in their relationship. Id. 
Investigators learned that much of the correspondence between Carter and Roy focused on Roy’s 
suicide. Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1057. 
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behind, and scolding him for delaying the process.115 Records also demonstrat-
ed that Carter and Roy had been on the phone minutes prior to Roy’s suicide, 
and that Carter later confessed to a friend that she told Roy to get back into the 
car when he expressed apprehension.116 
For Carter’s role in Roy’s suicide, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
brought involuntary manslaughter charges against her.117 In response to the 
charges, her defense lawyers argued that because Carter was not physically 
present at the time of Roy’s suicide and did not provide him with a physical 
instrument, Carter could not be convicted of involuntary manslaughter.118 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with Carter’s defense and 
held in Carter that, as a matter of law, verbal conduct can overcome a person’s 
will to live and be the cause of that person’s suicide.119 The Supreme Judicial 
Court also pointed to the circumstances surrounding Carter’s words—prior 
conversations on the topic of suicide, Carter’s virtual presence, and Roy’s 
known mental state—as relevant factors of the inquiry.120 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the coercive nature of Carter’s speech and the final direction to 
“get back in” the car were sufficient to show probable cause.121 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1057–59. In 2016, in Commonwealth v. Carter, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court was struck by the text that Carter repeated four times to Roy: “You just [have] to 
do it.” Id. at 1059 (alteration in original). Other texts indicating Carter’s encouragement include “Do it 
now like early” and “You’re ready and prepared. All you have to do is turn the generator on and you 
bee [sic] free and happy. No more pushing it off, no more waiting.” Exhibit 30, supra note 1, at 174. 
 116 Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1059. In addition to learning that she had texted a friend confessing her 
role in Roy’s suicide and fearing she would be punished, police also discovered that Carter deleted 
relevant text messages from her phone. Id. 
 117 Id. at 1056. In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, there are two theories that can prove 
involuntary manslaughter—wanton or reckless conduct or failure to act. Id. at 1060. Conduct rises to 
the level of wantonness or recklessness when it is intentional and a reasonable person would realize 
the intense likelihood of grave danger. Id. 
 118 Id. at 1061, 1062. Carter’s main defense was that verbal conduct never rises to the level of 
wantonness or recklessness needed to satisfy an involuntary manslaughter charge. Id. at 1061. 
 119 Id. at 1061, 1063. In making this determination, the court pointed to two cases where an indi-
vidual caused another person’s suicide. Id. at 1062–63. The first, Commonwealth v. Atencio in 1963, 
involved a “‘game’ of ‘Russian roulette’” where the two surviving players were convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter. 189 N.E.2d 223, 225–26 (Mass. 1963). The second, Persampieri v. Commonwealth 
in 1961, involved a defendant, a husband, who was charged with involuntary manslaughter after help-
ing his wife load a gun and calling her a “chicken” if she did not pull the trigger after knowing she 
was suicidal. 175 N.E.2d 387, 389–90 (Mass. 1961). The Persampieri court reasoned that because the 
defendant “showed a reckless disregard of his wife’s safety and the possible consequences of his con-
duct,” he could be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter following his wife’s suicide. Id. at 390.  
 120 Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1063. 
 121 Id. at 1063, 1059 n.8 (illustrating Michelle Carter’s text to Samantha Boardman). Following 
Roy’s death, Carter texted her friend, Samantha: 
[Roy’s] death is my fault like honestly I could have stopped him I was on the phone 
with him and he got out of the car because it was working and he got scared and I 
f[**]king told him to get back in . . . because I knew he would do it all over again the 
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On appeal, Carter’s defense raised, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court addressed, the First Amendment concerns at play.122 In 2019, in re-
affirming the conviction in Commonwealth v. Carter, the court first called at-
tention to the true threats and speech integral to criminal conduct categorical 
exclusions.123 Next, the court applied the strict scrutiny balancing test, pointing 
to the Commonwealth’s interest in preserving an individual’s life.124 The Su-
preme Judicial Court reasoned that the speech restriction was narrowly tailored 
because it only targeted Carter’s speech that overpowered Roy’s will to live, 
and therefore caused his suicide.125 As a result of these findings, the judge 
found Carter guilty of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced her to fifteen 
months in jail.126 
A second case in Massachusetts quickly proved that Carter was not a one-
time circumstance.127 Inyoung You and Alexander Urtula dated for eighteen 
months before Urtula jumped to his death in 2019.128 An inquiry into cellphone 
records and text messages showed You’s abusive and threatening conduct to-
wards Urtula leading up to his suicide.129 Even though You was aware of the 
impact her speech was having on Urtula’s mental well-being, according to the 
                                                                                                                           
next day and I couldn’t have him live the way he was living anymore I couldn’t do it I 
wouldn’t let him. 
Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 5765 (Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 
(2020). 
 122 Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 570–72. 
 123 Id. at 571.  
 124 Id. at 572. 
 125 Id. In 2019, in Commonwealth v. Carter, according to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, the final phone conversation telling Roy to get back in the truck when he was expressing con-
cerns about going through with his suicide was the deciding factor for Carter’s conviction. Id. at 567–
68.  
 126 Kate Taylor, What We Know About the Michelle Carter Suicide Texting Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/michelle-carter-i-love-you-now-die.html 
[https://perma.cc/MLV4-UMNX]. On January 13, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court announced it would 
not hear Carter’s appeal, thus upholding her conviction. Pete Williams, Supreme Court Won’t Hear 
Appeal of Michelle Carter, Convicted of Encouraging Boyfriend’s Death by Suicide with Text Mes-
sages, NBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-
will-not-consider-michelle-carter-appeal-urging-boyfriend-n1114381 [https://perma.cc/T6UU-SVNW]. 
The Bristol County Dartmouth Women’s Correctional Facility released Carter after she served less 
than twelve months of her fifteen-month sentence on January 23, 2020, in accordance with state law. 
Gal Tziperman Lotan & Emily Sweeney, Michelle Carter Released from Jail, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 23, 
2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/23/metro/michelle-carter-released-jail/ [https://perma.
cc/8XRC-3K9K]. 
 127 Julia Jones, Girlfriend Charged in Boston College Student’s Death After Telling Him ‘Hun-
dreds of Times’ to Kill Himself, Prosecutors Say, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/
10/28/us/boston-college-student-suicide-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/7C86-DDV5] (high-
lighting the comparison that has been drawn between Commonwealth v. Carter and Commonwealth v. 
You for their similar fact patterns). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6. 
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Suffolk County District Attorney’s press release, You continued to abuse Ur-
tula and even encouraged him to take his own life.130 
Unlike Carter, You was physically present when Urtula jumped from a 
parking garage.131 But there are strong similarities that exist between the 
Carter and You cases that the Suffolk County District Attorney highlighted 
when bringing forth the involuntary manslaughter charges against You.132 First, 
the Commonwealth accused each defendant of overpowering her significant 
other’s will to live.133 Second, both Carter and You, respectively, knew of 
Roy’s and Urtula’s troubled mental states, yet they continued with the 
abuse.134 Finally, a large portion of the communication was made over text 
message, not face-to-face, thus even further complicating the free speech ques-
tion.135 Although these factual distinctions exist, these cases, when read to-
gether, underscore the need to address the First Amendment’s role in relation 
to suicide-encouraging speech.136 Carter was the first case of its kind, but You 
proved that it definitely will not be the last.137 
B. A Word from the Critics: Was Michelle Carter’s Speech Protected? 
Although many view the actions of both defendants as morally wrong, 
when Carter’s conviction hit the media, it outraged staunch defenders of the 
First Amendment.138 The New York Times published an opinion piece titled 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id. The speech emphasized by the District Attorney included You’s telling Urtula to “‘go kill 
himself’ to ‘go die’ and that she, his family, and the world would be better off without him.” Id. 
 131 Compare id. (stating that You was present when Urtula jumped from the Renaissance Parking 
Garage in Roxbury, Massachusetts), with Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter I), 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1063 
(Mass. 2016) (noting Carter, on the other hand, was only virtually present, by communicating with 
Roy up until his death), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019). 
 132 Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1057–58 (indicating the large volume of abusive texts between the 
defendant and the deceased); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6 (emphasizing a similarly large 
number of abusive texts). 
 133 See Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 572 (Mass. 2019) (holding that 
Carter’s pressuring was wanton and reckless because it overpowered Roy’s will to live), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 910 (2020); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6 (emphasizing You’s wanton and reck-
less behavior that created a life-threatening situation and overpowered Urtula’s will to live). 
 134 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 562 (stating that a large part of Carter’s conversations with Roy 
were about his mental health problems); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6 (claiming that You 
encouraged Urtula’s suicide and continued to abuse him even though she knew of his fragile mental 
state). 
 135 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 562 (noting the “numerous text messages” exchanged between 
Carter and Roy in the days leading up to his suicide); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6 (reveal-
ing that You and Urtula exchanged over 75,000 texts). 
 136 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 562; Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6. 
 137 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 569–70 (depicting cases on which the court relied that had factual 
differences from the Carter case, including the physical presence of the defendant and the act of 
providing a weapon); Press Release, Algarin 1, supra note 6. 
 138 See, e.g., Veronika Bondarenko, 20-Year-Old Who Repeatedly Urged Friend to Commit Sui-
cide Found Guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2017), https://www.business
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“Michelle Carter Didn’t Kill with a Text” and the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Massachusetts released a statement indicating that the decision was 
an abandonment of “the protections of our constitution.”139 This Section pro-
vides an examination of the various arguments put forth by those who criti-
cized the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Carter on First 
Amendment grounds.140 
First and foremost, critics have emphasized the government’s inability to 
restrict speech it deems morally reprehensible.141 The most basic understand-
ing of the First Amendment is that the government is unable to restrict speech 
“because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”142 The 
U.S. Supreme Court has underscored its commitment to protecting speech, 
especially when society finds the speech to be “offensive or disagreeable.”143 
It would be difficult to argue that Carter’s texts were not offensive or 
morally wrong because of her blatant encouragement of Roy’s suicide.144 As 
critics have noted, however, the law does not punish morally reprehensible 
conduct on those grounds alone, and the First Amendment has historically pro-
vided substantial protection for disagreeable speech.145 Therefore, by punish-
ing speech as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did, some argue that it 
undermined the important historic protections of the First Amendment.146 
                                                                                                                           
insider.com/michelle-carter-texting-suicide-guilty-conrad-roy-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/SQ7K-QY6D] 
(stating that the outcome of the case has left legal scholars divided on whether Carter’s conduct was 
punishable by law); Soave, supra note 22 (describing Carter’s conduct as “morally reprehensible,” 
and her criminal conviction as “unjust”). 
 139 Soave, supra note 22 (statement of Matthew Segal, the American Civil Liberties (ACLU) of 
Massachusetts Director); see also Press Release, Matthew Segal, Legal Dir., ACLU of Mass., Statement 
on Michelle Carter Guilty Verdict (June 16, 2017), https://www.aclum.org/en/press-releases/aclu-
massachusetts-statement-michelle-carter-guilty-verdict [https://perma.cc/ST3R-BYUK]. The ACLU also 
filed a brief in support of Carter’s appeal. Dan Glaun, Michelle Carter Case: ACLU, State Public De-
fender Agency File Brief in Support of Teenager Accused of Encouraging Boyfriend to Kill Himself, 
MASS LIVE (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2016/04/michelle_carter_case_aclu_stat.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q7E9-6YTT]. In its brief, the ACLU argued both that minors should not be held to the 
same standard as adults and that encouraging another person to commit suicide does not violate Massa-
chusetts law. Brief of the Youth Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts as Amici Curiae in Support of the Appellant at 1, 
Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter I), 52 N.E.3d 1054 (Mass. 2016) (No. SJC-12043), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 
559 (Mass. 2019).  
 140 See infra notes 141–166 and accompanying text. This Section focuses on Commonwealth v. 
Carter because a resolution in Commonwealth v. You remains pending as of the publication date of 
this Note. See infra notes 141–179 and accompanying text. 
 141 Soave, supra note 22. 
 142 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 143 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
 144 See Soave, supra note 22 (stating that Carter’s conduct was “morally reprehensible”). 
 145 Id. Robby Soave emphasizes that morally wrong behavior is distinct from criminal behavior; 
Carter’s behavior, Soave argues, was the former. Id. 
 146 Id. In Massachusetts, an individual can be convicted of criminal harassment when that person 
“willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of 
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Second, Massachusetts lacks a statute criminalizing suicide, assisted sui-
cide, or encouraging suicide.147 Although some critics have admitted that the 
Carter case could have been simple had such a statute existed, that was not the 
situation in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found itself.148 
Stated otherwise, because assisting another’s suicide in Massachusetts is not a 
crime, some contend, Carter’s speech could not have been fallen into the 
carveout of speech integral to criminal conduct on that basis.149 
Furthermore, some have argued that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court also incorrectly applied this First Amendment carveout because of the 
criminal charge itself.150 Critics have noted that the more fitting crime with 
which to charge Carter would have dealt with harassment or bullying, but not 
homicide.151 Therefore, when the Supreme Judicial Court stated that “wanton 
or reckless pressuring” overpowered Roy’s will to live, some have argued that 
the court misconstrued an already controversial exception to the First Amend-
ment.152 
Third, the Supreme Judicial Court arguably established a new precedent 
when it upheld Carter’s conviction.153 In Massachusetts, involuntary man-
slaughter is defined as the unintentional killing of another caused by wanton or 
                                                                                                                           
time directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43A(a) (West 
2020). This statute includes electronic communications. See id. (listing the use of an electronic com-
munication device as a possible means of conducting criminal acts). 
 147 Guyora Binder & Luis Chiesa, The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 65, 74 
(2019); Press Release, Segal, supra note 139. 
 148 See Shawnee Melnick, Prosecution for Encouraging Suicide: How the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court Ignored the First Amendment, 28 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 282, 295, 300–01 (2019) 
(criticizing the Supreme Judicial Court given that Massachusetts does not have a law regarding suicide 
or assisted suicide). 
 149 See id.; see also Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (establishing 
that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not protect speech integral to violating a crim-
inal statute). 
 150 Melanie Eversley, Girlfriend Suicide Texting Case Sets Wrong Precedent, Legal Experts Say, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/08/03/michelle-carter-
texting-suicide-case-sets-bad-precedent-experts-say/538794001/ [https://perma.cc/5XU5-4WFW]. 
 151 See Sean Sweeney, Note, Deadly Speech: Encouraging Suicide and Problematic Prosecu-
tions, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 941, 974 (2017) (arguing that Carter’s conduct was more aligned 
with anti-bullying statutes than a homicide charge). 
 152 See Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter II), 115 N.E.3d 559, 572 (Mass. 2019) (holding that 
Carter’s pressuring was wanton and reckless because it overpowered Roy’s will to live), cert. denied, 
140 S. Ct. 910 (2020); Kaitlin M. Phillips, Note, Sticks and Stones May Break Your Bones, but Words 
Can Also Kill: Limiting Criminal Liability for Words, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1741, 1743 (noting the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s controversial use of the involuntary manslaughter statute to 
uphold Carter’s conviction); Sweeney, supra note 151, at 954, 957 (underscoring the challenge and 
uncertainty regarding whether Carter’s conduct truly was the proximate cause of Roy’s death, as re-
quired by an involuntary manslaughter charge). 
 153 Melnick, supra note 148, at 289. 
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reckless conduct.154 Prior to Carter’s conviction, there had never been a case in 
Massachusetts where a court convicted an individual of homicide when the 
suicidal encouragement was limited to words alone.155 Furthermore, Carter’s 
“virtual presence” presented another new dimension for the court to consider 
when examining causation.156 
In upholding the conviction, and rejecting these challenges, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied upon two cases in which the conduct of 
one person led to another’s suicide.157 As a number of critics argue, Carter was 
distinct from the cases cited as precedent because Carter did not provide the 
physical weapon used nor was she physically present for the suicide.158 Thus, 
critics argue that Carter may have been entitled to First Amendment protection 
because her only conduct at issue was speech, and criminal law typically only 
punishes when a physical act is involved.159 
Finally, as critics have noted, the Supreme Judicial Court convicted Carter 
based on the content of her messages.160 Therefore, they have argued that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, requiring that a restriction of 
speech be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.161 In this case, 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Model Jury Instructions on Homicide: VII. Involuntary Manslaughter, MASS.GOV (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://www.mass.gov/info-details/model-jury-instructions-on-homicide-vii-involuntary-man-
slaughter [https://perma.cc/KMX3-W6J4]. Wanton or reckless conduct can be an affirmative act that 
creates a high likelihood that substantial harm to another will result. Id. It can also be failure to act 
when the defendant has a duty to do so. Id. The causation element requires that the defendant’s con-
duct be within the natural chain of events that led to the victim’s death, meaning that without the de-
fendant’s conduct, the death would not have occurred. Id. 
 155 Binder & Chiesa, supra note 147, at 66. Typically, in the rare instance when a person is 
charged for another’s suicide, a more concrete tie to the killing exists beyond just words. Id. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court referenced Commonwealth v. Atencio and Persampieri v. Com-
monwealth, where the defendants were charged with involuntary manslaughter following another’s 
suicide, but in both cases, the defendants handed the victim the gun. Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter 
I), 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1062 (Mass. 2016), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019); Binder & Chiesa, supra 
note 147, at 76. 
 156 Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1063; Binder & Chiesa, supra note 147, at 66. 
 157 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 569, 570–74; see also Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 
223, 224 (Mass. 1963) (holding that the defendants were guilty of involuntary manslaughter for the 
death of another person with whom they were playing a “‘game’ of ‘Russian roulette’”); Persampieri 
v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1961) (concluding that the defendant was wanton and 
reckless when taunting his wife with the idea of killing herself when he knew she was suicidal). 
 158 Melnick, supra note 148, at 289. 
 159 Id. For instance, in Persampieri, a physical act—the handing of a gun—accompanied the 
harmful, taunting speech. 175 N.E.2d at 389; Melnick, supra note 148, at 289. Carter, on the other 
hand, never provided Roy with a weapon. See Carter I, 52 N.E.3d at 1062–63 (drawing parallels be-
tween cases involving a physical act, but still finding that Carter’s actions through words supported 
the involuntary manslaughter charge). 
 160 Melnick, supra note 148, at 296–97. 
 161 Id. 
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the compelling state interest was the preservation of Roy’s life, but whether it 
was the most narrowly tailored regulation has been subject to debate.162 
Generally speaking, it is rare that a content-based regulation can survive a 
strict scrutiny inquiry.163 Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
noted that the regulation of speech would not hinder end-of-life discussions 
and other conversations related to suicide, critics have indicated that is a slip-
pery slope to endorse.164 Furthermore, the defense argued that the government 
did not satisfy its burden of proof by demonstrating the regulation constituted 
the least restrictive means of accomplishing its goal of protecting life.165 The 
Supreme Judicial Court firmly rejected this argument, stating that the govern-
ment still prevailed under strict scrutiny, and the U.S. Supreme Court solidified 
the holding when it denied Carter’s appeal in 2020.166 
C. A Look from the Court: Why a First Amendment  
Violation Does Not Exist in Carter 
When Carter and her lawyers pressed the First Amendment issues presented 
by her conviction, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not shy away 
from addressing those concerns.167 In fact, in affirming its initial decision fol-
lowing the grant of an application for direct appellate review, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court specifically addressed the First Amendment assertions 
raised by the defense.168 
First, in 2019, the Massachusetts court turned directly to the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s precedential 1949 decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice 
Co.169 In Giboney, the Court held that the First Amendment does not protect 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 571–72 (emphasizing the state’s compelling interest to preserve 
an individual’s life); Melnick, supra note 148, at 296 (discussing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s scrutiny inquiry). 
 163 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011). 
 164 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 572 (acknowledging specifically that physician-assisted suicides 
and related discussions were outside the scope of the Massachusetts court’s decision); Press Release, 
Segal, supra note 139 (stating that the potentially broad reach of the Carter decision could enter into 
other suicide-related discussions, including those between a doctor and adult patient). 
 165 See United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding that content-
based restrictions must be the least restrictive means possible to satisfy strict scrutiny); Carter II, 115 
N.E.3d at 571. 
 166 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 572; Travis Andersen et al., Supreme Court Won’t Hear Michelle 
Carter Case, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/01/13/metro/supreme-
court-wont-hear-michelle-carter-case/ [https://perma.cc/T8DZ-LDM4]. 
 167 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 570–72 (dedicating an entire section in the opinion to addressing 
the First Amendment claims raised by Carter’s defense team). 
 168 See id. at 562. 
 169 Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 570–71 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2019)); 
see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495, 498 (1949) (holding that states have the 
power to restrict speech and expression when they cause others to commit crimes). In 1949, in 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., members of an ice peddler union picketed their place of busi-
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speech that is an integral part of conduct that leads to violation of a criminal 
statute.170 In Carter, the statute in question was involuntary manslaughter.171 
The court reasoned that because the pressuring messages and phone calls over-
whelmed Roy’s willpower to live, Carter’s speech was the coercive conduct that 
led to his death by suicide.172 To the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
Carter’s conduct fit within a well-established First Amendment carveout.173 
The court’s analysis, however, continued by addressing the strict scrutiny 
arguments also raised by Carter’s defense.174 Because both Carter and the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts acknowledged the compelling state interest 
of preserving life, the court was only forced to confront the “narrowly tailored” 
prong of the strict scrutiny test.175 The court made it clear that it was not target-
ing all end-of-life conversations.176 Rather, it saw Carter as a very specific sit-
uation in which one person pressured another to commit suicide by overpower-
ing that person’s will to live.177 Therefore, the court held that, even in the ab-
sence of a First Amendment carveout, the regulation of Carter’s speech could 
survive a strict scrutiny challenge.178 Consequently, affirming the conviction 
signified the first time the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has ever found 
that words alone can amount to an involuntary manslaughter conviction.179 
                                                                                                                           
ness to force the plaintiff, Empire Storage and Ice Company, to stop selling to non-union members. 
336 U.S. at 492. Because Missouri had a statute that prohibited the creation of agreements restricting 
trade, the defendants’ conduct could be restricted without running afoul of the First Amendment, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court viewed the conduct as leading to a violation of a criminal statute. Id. at 492–
93, 495, 504. 
 170 336 U.S. at 502. 
 171 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 54 (West 2020) (containing Massachusetts’ statute pertain-
ing to youthful offenders who are charged as adults); id. ch. 265, § 13 (stating Massachusetts’ invol-
untary manslaughter statute); Commonwealth v. Carter (Carter I), 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1056 (Mass. 
2016), aff’d, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019).  
 172 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 13; Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 570. 
 173 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 570 (holding that First Amendment concerns are not valid be-
cause of the Giboney precedent establishing a carveout for speech integral to criminal conduct). 
 174 Id. at 571–72. 
 175 Id. at 571. 
 176 Id. at 572. 
 177 Id.; see Gora, supra note 12, at 65 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s willingness to heavily 
protect speech in many settings, and its general unwillingness to categorize speech as unprotected). 
 178 Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 572. 
 179 See id. at 572, 574 (holding that Carter’s wanton and reckless words caused Roy’s death by 
suicide); Phillips, supra note 152, at 1768–69 (arguing that Carter’s conviction was the “first of its 
kind” in that the court held that words can be considered an “overt act” in relation to an involuntary 
manslaughter charge). 
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III. RIGHT OUTCOME, WRONG APPROACH: CONSTITUTIONAL 
ALTERNATIVES TO CRIMINALIZING SPEECH THAT ENCOURAGES SUICIDE 
Commonwealth v. Carter was the first of its kind, with Commonwealth v. 
You following closely on its heels.180 This Part argues in favor of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s outcome in Carter but considers alternative 
rationales that could have minimized the surrounding First Amendment chal-
lenges.181 Section A begins with a discussion of the workability of current First 
Amendment doctrine in the wake of technological changes, calling on the U.S. 
Supreme Court for assistance.182 Section B then explains the opportunity 
missed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court when it failed to empha-
size the purely private nature of the speech in question and chose not to apply 
additional First Amendment carveouts that may have been appropriate.183 Last-
ly, Section C concludes with a strict scrutiny analysis of proposed legislation 
that could eliminate the gray area surrounding suicide-encouraging text mes-
sages for future cases.184 
A. Free Speech and Technology: Can the First Amendment  
Adequately Handle the Changing Times? 
Technology presents new challenges for the First Amendment, and Carter 
forced the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to confront these con-
cerns.185 Furthermore, You serves as a warning that Carter is not the only of its 
kind, and similar clashes between the First Amendment and technology are 
likely to persist.186 These continuing clashes challenge whether the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution can adapt to the changing technological 
world in which we live.187 
                                                                                                                           
 180 Tiernan, supra note 9. 
 181 See infra notes 185–226 and accompanying text. 
 182 See infra notes 185–194 and accompanying text. 
 183 See infra notes 195–212 and accompanying text. 
 184 See infra notes 213–226 and accompanying text. 
 185 Tiernan, supra note 9. 
 186 See id. (quoting the opinion of Harvey Silverglate, a civil liberties and constitutional law ex-
pert, who believes the U.S. Supreme Court needs to issue a decision tackling the First Amendment 
questions raised in the Commonwealth v. Carter and Commonwealth v. You cases to avoid further 
uncertainty surrounding the intersection of speech, technology, and criminal conduct). 
 187 See AJ Willingham, The First Amendment Doesn’t Guarantee You the Rights You Think It 
Does, CNN POL. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/politics/first-amendment-explainer-
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/LPX5-7BC5] (providing examples of when the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution does and does not offer protection in a number of modern-day situations). For 
instance, a social media company, because it is private, can remove an account without running afoul 
of the First Amendment. Id. The President, on the other hand, violates the First Amendment when 
blocking a user on Twitter. Charlie Savage, Trump Can’t Block Critics from His Twitter Account, 
Appeals Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/politics/
trump-twitter-first-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/RMQ5-L2TV]. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
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In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Stevens underscored 
its reluctance to establish new categories of First Amendment carveouts.188 The 
Court emphasized the long-established categories well-known to the courts, 
thus indicating that new categories were unlikely to be established.189 The 
Court did not, however, foreclose the possibility completely.190 
It is important to remember the ways in which the First Amendment 
carveouts first emerged.191 Simply put, the Supreme Court continued to chip 
away at the absolute guarantee of free speech in response to societal needs.192 
With the evolution of technology, including the ability to be virtually present 
through social media, texting, and other forms of communication, the Supreme 
Court can follow its original approach to create new categories of unprotected 
speech in response to present-day needs.193 Consequently, the Court could 
more adequately serve the government’s interest in protecting life in the digital 
age, an interest that only emerged in response to technology.194 
B. The Massachusetts Court’s Missed Opportunities 
Even absent an overarching development from the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court failed to support its 2019 Common-
wealth v. Carter holding in two important ways.195 First, Michelle Carter’s 
purely private speech was not entitled to the highest level of protection.196 
Second, existing carveouts, besides speech integral to criminal conduct, were 
potentially relevant to, or at least supportive of, the court’s analysis.197 
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 197 See infra notes 205–212 and accompanying text. 
2021] When Suicide-Encouraging Texts Are Not Constitutionally Protected 1043 
First, it has long been established that purely private matters do not war-
rant the same level of protection as matters of public concern.198 The rationale 
behind this principle is that private matters do not threaten debate of public 
issues or discussion of ideas, and the threat of chilling speech is less worri-
some.199 Carter’s speech was undoubtedly a purely private matter.200 It did not 
relate to any concerns of the community, it was not a news item, and it did not 
address matters of general interest.201 She directed her texts specifically to-
wards Conrad Roy and his contemplated suicide.202 Therefore, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court missed an important opportunity to illustrate the 
private nature of the speech at issue.203 Had the court done so, it could have 
better demonstrated that there was no free speech concern because Carter’s 
speech was not the kind of public-concerning speech that the First Amendment 
seeks to protect.204 
Second, Massachusetts’s lack of an assisted suicide statute made it espe-
cially difficult to fit Carter’s speech in question into the speech integral to 
criminal conduct exception, which was the Supreme Judicial Court’s focus.205 
As critics have noted, this forced the court to creatively categorize Carter’s 
conduct as involuntary manslaughter in order to make the exception fit.206 Had 
the court considered other First Amendment carveouts, such as the fighting 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (holding 
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 205 See Carter II, 115 N.E.3d at 570–71 (emphasizing that Carter’s speech that was integral to a 
criminal act—the wanton or reckless killing of Roy—was being punished by the court); Press Release, 
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words and true threats exceptions, it could have potentially avoided some of 
the related criticism it received.207 Although the fighting words exception is 
also not a perfect match, in today’s world in which communication often does 
not occur face-to-face, the court could have expanded the exception to include 
communications that are just as violence-inducing, even when a screen sepa-
rates the parties.208 
Similarly, the true threats exception is also not a perfect fit, but the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court should still have more fully considered it.209 
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black articulated that placing 
another person in fear of bodily harm or death constitutes a true threat.210 
Carter’s texts did just that—they intimidated Roy so much that they overpow-
ered his own will to live.211 Although Carter herself did not intend to harm Roy 
physically, her abusive and threatening speech constituted an act of violence.212 
C. The Limit Must Exist: A Look at Proposed Legislation 
With the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for Commonwealth v. 
Carter and the strikingly similar fact pattern in Commonwealth v. You, legisla-
tion appears to be the surest way of constitutionally criminalizing suicide-
encouraging speech and leaving significantly less room for uncertainty.213 With 
the proposal of Conrad’s Law, the Massachusetts legislature has already begun 
this process.214 
If passed, Conrad’s Law would make it a separate crime to coerce another 
person into committing suicide.215 First, it would make it illegal to overcome 
another person’s will to live through substantial control, manipulation, or un-
due influence.216 Second, it would criminalize enabling another person to 
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commit suicide either by providing the physical means (such as a weapon) or 
the knowledge, or participating in a physical act that causes a suicide or sui-
cide attempt.217 
Because courts will likely view this law as a content-based restriction on 
free speech in certain situations such as Carter and You, the hurdle will be sur-
viving a constitutional challenge that invokes a strict scrutiny inquiry.218 Strict 
scrutiny mandates a compelling governmental interest and requires that the 
speech restriction be narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s objec-
tive—in this case, preserving life in the digital age.219 
Cyberbullying statutes, which have recently been under scrutiny for vio-
lating the First Amendment, are a helpful guide because they similarly address 
speech in cyberspace.220 Typically, critics have asserted that cyberbullying 
statutes are often overly broad or too vague, which fails the second prong of 
strict scrutiny analysis.221 Although states do have a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting children in particular from the harms of cyberbullying, courts have tak-
en issue with the lack of a clear definition for what constitutes cyberbullying, 
and they have also invalidated statutes that effectively criminalize constitu-
tionally protected speech by adults.222 
Conrad’s Law, on the other hand, provides clear definitions and sets much 
more narrowly tailored limitations on speech that the statute may restrict.223 For 
example, the bill specifically notes that it does not extend to physician-assisted 
suicide and related conversations, and the statute requires actual knowledge by 
the speaker of the other person’s suicidal ideation before assigning criminal cul-
pability.224 Therefore, Conrad’s Law arguably has a higher likelihood of surviv-
ing a strict scrutiny inquiry than cyberbullying statutes that courts have deemed 
unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.225 It remains unclear how You 
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will conclude, but Conrad’s Law—and others that take a similar position—will 
hopefully allow for fewer First Amendment questions in future cases.226 
CONCLUSION 
Conrad Roy’s and Alexander Urtula’s deaths, no doubt, are tragedies. 
This is not only because the circumstances leading to their deaths were morally 
wrong, but also because the conduct at issue was criminal. Neither Michelle 
Carter nor Inyoung You said what they did to add to the marketplace of ideas 
or contribute to public debate. They utilized their words—which were as harm-
ful as physical actions—to coerce two other people into taking their owns lives 
by suicide. Allowing Carter and You to hide behind the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution does not fulfil the purpose of free speech protection; rather, it 
allows them to get away with causing the death of another. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did not reach its conclusion in 
Commonwealth v. Carter through perfectly sound reasoning, but the outcome 
was correct. The Carter and You cases present a unique opportunity for society, 
lawmakers, and the courts to rethink the First Amendment in today’s modern 
world. The reality is that communication and speech are taking new forms, and 
the dangers are enormous without adequate laws or regulation. Whether the 
U.S. Supreme Court decides to join the conversation by creating a new catego-
ry or expanding its long-established ones, or individual states pass statutes that 
protect against the emerging dangers that accompany technological develop-
ments, it is clear something must be done. This is not a question of morality; 
rather, it is a question of criminal culpability. 
COURTNEY E. RUGGERI 
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